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Scoring rules and voting trees are two broad and concisely-representable classes of
voting rules; scoring rules award points to alternatives according to their position in
the preferences of the voters, while voting trees are iterative procedures that select
an alternative based on pairwise comparisons. In this paper, we investigate the PAC-
learnability of these classes of rules. We demonstrate that the class of scoring rules, as
functions from preferences into alternatives, is eﬃciently learnable in the PAC model. With
respect to voting trees, while in general a learning algorithm would require an exponential
number of samples, we show that if the number of leaves is polynomial in the size of the
set of alternatives, then a polynomial training set suﬃces. We apply these results in an
emerging theory: automated design of voting rules by learning.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Voting is a well-studied method of preference aggregation, in terms of its theoretical properties, as well as its computa-
tional aspects [6,21]; various practical, implemented applications that use voting exist [9,12,13].
In an election, n voters express their preferences over a set of m alternatives. To be precise, each voter is assumed to
reveal linear preferences—a ranking of the alternatives. The outcome of the election is determined according to a voting rule.
In this paper we will consider two families of voting rules: scoring rules and voting trees.
Scoring rules. The predominant—ubiquitous, even—voting rule in real-life elections is the Plurality rule. Under Plurality, each
voter awards one point to the alternative it ranks ﬁrst, i.e., its most preferred alternative. The alternative that accumulated
the most points, summed over all voters, wins the election. Another example of a voting rule is the Veto rule: each voter
“vetoes” a single alternative; the alternative that was vetoed by the fewest voters wins the election. Yet a third example
is the Borda rule: every voter awards m − 1 points to its top-ranked alternative, m − 2 points to its second choice, and so
forth—the least preferred alternative is not awarded any points. Once again, the alternative with the most points is elected.
The above-mentioned three voting rules all belong to an important family of voting rules known as scoring rules. A scoring
rule can be expressed by a vector of parameters α = 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αm〉, where each αl is a real number and α1  α2 
· · ·  αm . Each voter awards α1 points to its most-preferred alternative, α2 to its second-most-preferred alternative, etc.
Predictably, the alternative with the most points wins. Under this uniﬁed framework, we can express our three rules as:
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• Plurality: α = 〈1,0, . . . ,0〉.
• Borda: α = 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,0〉.
• Veto: α = 〈1, . . . ,1,0〉.
A good indication of the importance of scoring rules is given by the fact that they are exactly the family of voting rules
that are anonymous (indifferent to the identities of the voters), neutral (indifferent to the identities of the alternatives), and
consistent (an alternative that is elected by two separate sets of voters is elected overall) [26].
Voting trees. Some voting rules rely on the concept of pairwise elections: alternative a beats alternative b in the pairwise
election between a and b if the majority2 of voters prefers a to b. Ideally, we would like to select an alternative that beats
every other alternative in a pairwise election, but such an alternative (called a Condorcet winner) does not always exist.
However, there are other prominent voting rules that rely on the concept of pairwise elections, which select an alterna-
tive in a sense “close” to the Condorcet winner. In the Copeland rule, for example, the score of an alternative is the number
of alternatives it beats in a pairwise election; the alternative with the highest score wins. In the Maximin rule, the score of
an alternative is the number of votes it gets in its worst pairwise election (the least number of voters that prefer it to some
alternative), and, predictably, the winner is the alternative that scores highest.
When discussing such voting rules, it is possible to consider a more abstract setting. A tournament T over A is a com-
plete binary asymmetric relation over A (that is, for any two alternatives a and b, aTb or bTa, but not both). Clearly, the
aforementioned majority relation induces a tournament (a beats b in the pairwise election iff aTb). More generally, this
relation can reﬂect a reality that goes beyond a strict voting scenario. For example, the tournament can represent a basket-
ball league, where aTb if team a is expected to beat team b in a game. We denote the set of all tournaments over A by
T = T (A).
So, for the moment let us look at (pairwise) voting rules as simply functions f : T → A. The most prominent class of
such functions is the class of binary voting trees. Each function in the class is represented by a binary tree, with the leaves
labeled by alternatives. At each node, the alternatives at the two children compete; the winner ascends to the node (so
if a and b compete and aTb, a ascends). The winner-determination procedure starts at the leaves and proceeds upwards
towards the root; the alternative that survives to the root is the winner of the election.
For example, assume that the alternatives are a, b, and c, and bTa, cTb, and aT c. In the tree given in Fig. 1, b beats a
and is subsequently beaten by c in the right subtree, while a beats c in the left subtree. a and c ultimately compete at the
root, making a the winner of the election.
Notice that we allow an alternative to appear in multiple leaves; further, some alternatives may not appear at all (so, for
example, a singleton tree is a constant function).
Motivation and setting. We consider the following setting: an entity, which we refer to as the designer, has in mind a voting
rule (which may reﬂect the ethics of a society). We assume that the designer is able, for each constellation of voters’
preferences with which it is presented, to designate a winning alternative (perhaps with considerable computational effort).
In particular, one can think of the designer’s representation of the voting rule as a black box that matches preference proﬁles
to winning alternatives. This setting is relevant, for example, when a designer has in mind different properties it wants its
rule to satisfy; in this case, given a preference proﬁle, the designer can specify a winning alternative that is compatible with
these properties.
We would like to ﬁnd a concise and easily understandable representation of the voting rule the designer has in mind. We
refer to this process as automated design of voting rules: given a speciﬁcation of properties, or, indeed, of societal ethics, ﬁnd
an elegant voting rule that implements the speciﬁcation. In this paper, we do so by learning from examples. The designer is
presented with different preference proﬁles, drawn according to a ﬁxed distribution. For each proﬁle, the designer answers
with the winning alternative. The number of queries presented to the designer must intuitively be as small as possible: the
computations the designer has to carry out in order to handle each query might be complex, and communication might be
costly.
2 We will assume, for simplicity, an odd number of voters.
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known to belong to some family R of voting rules. We would like to produce a voting rule from R that is as “close” as
possible to the target rule.
By “close,” we mean close with respect to the ﬁxed distribution over preference proﬁles. More precisely, we would like
to construct an algorithm that receives pairs of the form (preferences, winner) drawn according to a ﬁxed distribution D
over preferences, and outputs a rule from R, such that the probability according to D that our rule and the target rule agree
is as high as possible. We wish, in fact, to learn rules from R in the framework of the formal PAC (Probably Approximately
Correct) learning model; a concise introduction to this model is given in Section 2.
In this paper, we look at two options for the choice of R: the family of scoring rules, and the family of voting trees.
These are natural choices, since both are broad classes of rules, and both have concise representations. Choosing R as above,
the designer could in principle translate the possibly cumbersome, unknown representation of a voting rule into a succinct
one that can be easily understood and computed.
Further justiﬁcation for our agenda is given by noting that it might be diﬃcult to compute a voting rule on all instances,
but it might be suﬃcient to simply calculate the election’s result on typical instances. The distribution D can be chosen, by
the designer, to concentrate on such instances.
Our results. The dimension of a function class is a combinatorial measure of the richness of the class; this dimension is
closely related to the number of examples needed to learn the class. We give almost tight bounds on the dimension of the
class of scoring rules, providing an upper bound of m, and a lower bound of m−3, where m is the number of alternatives in
an election. In addition, we show that, given a set of examples, one can eﬃciently construct a scoring rule that is consistent
with the examples, if one exists. Combined, these results imply the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. The class of scoring rules over n voters and m alternatives is eﬃciently learnable for all values of n and m.
In other words, given a combination of properties that is satisﬁed by some scoring rule, it is possible to construct a
“close” scoring rule in polynomial time.
The situation with respect to the learnability of voting trees is two-fold: in general, due to the expressiveness and
possible complexity of binary trees, the number of examples required is exponential in m. However, if we assume that
the number of leaves is polynomial in m, then the required number of examples is also polynomial in m. In addition, we
investigate the computational complexity of problems associated with the learning process.
It is also worthwhile to ask whether it is possible to extend this approach. Speciﬁcally, we pose the question: given a
class of voting rules R, if the designer has some general voting rule in mind (rather than a voting rule that is known to
belong to R), is it possible to learn a “close” rule from R? We prove, for a natural deﬁnition of approximation:
Theorem 5.3. Let Rnm be a family of voting rules of size exponential in n and m. Let , δ > 0. For large enough values of n and m, at
least a (1− δ)-fraction of the voting rules f :Ln → {x1, . . . , xm} satisfy the following property: no voting rule in Rnm is a (1/2+ )-
approximation of f .
In particular, we show that the theorem holds for scoring rules and small voting trees, thus answering the question
posed above in the negative with respect to these classes.
Related work. Currently there exists a small body of work on learning in economic settings. Kalai [16] explores the learn-
ability (in the PAC model) of rationalizable choice functions. These are functions which, given a set of alternatives, choose
the element that is maximal with respect to some linear order. Similarly, PAC learning has very recently been applied to
computing utility functions that are rationalizations of given sequences of prices and demands [2].
Another prominent example is the paper by Lahaie and Parkes [17], which considers preference elicitation in combina-
torial auctions. The authors show that preference elicitation algorithms can be constructed on the basis of existing learning
algorithms. The learning model used, exact learning, differs from ours (PAC learning).
Conitzer and Sandholm [3] have studied automated mechanism design, in the more restricted setting where agents
have numerical valuations for different alternatives. They propose automatically designing a truthful mechanism for every
preference aggregation setting. However, they ﬁnd that, under two solution concepts, even determining whether there exists
a deterministic mechanism that guarantees a certain social welfare is an NP-complete problem. The authors also show
that the problem is tractable when designing a randomized mechanism. In more recent work [5], Conitzer and Sandholm
put forward an eﬃcient algorithm for designing deterministic mechanisms, which works only in very limited scenarios. In
short, our setting, goals, and methods are completely different—in the general voting context, even framing computational
complexity questions is problematic, since the goal cannot be speciﬁed with reference to expected social welfare.
Some authors have studied the computational properties of scoring rules. For instance, Conitzer et al. [6] have in-
vestigated the computational complexity of the coalitional manipulation problem in several scoring rules; Procaccia and
Rosenschein [21] generalized their results, and ﬁnally, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [14] gave a full characterization.
Many other papers deal with the complexity of manipulation and control in elections, and, inter alia, discuss scoring rules
(see, e.g., [1,4,8,15,22,27]).
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al. [18], which studied the computational complexity of selecting different types of winners in elections governed by voting
trees. Fischer et al. [10] investigated the power of voting trees in approximating the maximum degree in a tournament.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we give an introduction to the PAC model. In Section 3, we present our results with
respect to scoring rules. In Section 4, we investigate voting trees. In Section 5, we discuss a possible extension of our
approach. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we give a very short introduction to the PAC model and the generalized dimension of a function class.
A more comprehensive (and slightly more formal) overview of the model, and results concerning the dimension, can be
found in [20].
In the PAC model, the learner is attempting to learn a function f : Z → Y , which belongs to a class F of functions
from Z to Y . The learner is given a training set—a set {z1, z2, . . . , zt} of points in Z , which are sampled i.i.d. (independently
and identically distributed) according to a distribution D over the sample space Z . D is unknown, but is ﬁxed throughout
the learning process. In this paper, we assume the “realizable” case, where a target function f ∗(z) exists, and the given
training examples are in fact labeled by the target function: {(zk, f ∗(zk))}tk=1. The error of a function f ∈ F is deﬁned as
err( f ) = Pr
z∼D
[
f (z) 	= f ∗(z)]. (1)
 > 0 is a parameter given to the learner that deﬁnes the accuracy of the learning process: we would like to achieve
err(h)  . Notice that err( f ∗) = 0. The learner is also given a conﬁdence parameter δ > 0, that provides an upper bound on






We now formalize the discussion above:
Deﬁnition 2.1. (See [20].)
1. A learning algorithm L is a function from the set of all training examples to F with the following property: given
, δ ∈ (0,1) there exists an integer s(, δ)—the sample complexity—such that for any distribution D on X , if Z is a
sample of size at least s where the samples are drawn i.i.d. according to D , then with probability at least 1− δ it holds
that err(L(Z))  .
2. L is an eﬃcient learning algorithm if it always runs in time polynomial in 1/ , 1/δ, and the size of the representations
of the target function, of elements in X , and of elements in Y .
3. A function class F is (eﬃciently) PAC-learnable if there is an (eﬃcient) learning algorithm for F .
The sample complexity of a learning algorithm for F is closely related to a measure of the class’s combinatorial richness
known as the generalized dimension.
Deﬁnition 2.2. (See [20].) Let F be a class of functions from Z to Y . We say F shatters S ⊆ Z if there exist two functions
f , g ∈ F such that
1. For all z ∈ S , f (z) 	= g(z).
2. For all S1 ⊆ S , there exists h ∈ F such that for all z ∈ S1, h(z) = f (z), and for all z ∈ S \ S1, h(z) = g(z).
Deﬁnition 2.3. (See [20].) Let F be a class of functions from a set Z to a set Y . The generalized dimension of F , denoted by
DG(F), is the greatest integer d such that there exists a set of cardinality d that is shattered by F .
Lemma 2.4. (See [20, Lemma 5.1].) Let Z and Y be two ﬁnite sets and let F be a set of total functions from Z to Y . If d = DG(F ), then
2d  |F |.
A function’s generalized dimension provides both upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of algorithms.
Theorem 2.5. (See [20, Theorem 5.1].) Let F be a class of functions from Z to Y of generalized dimension d. Let L be an algorithm
such that, when given a set of t labeled examples {(zk, f ∗(zk))}k of some f ∗ ∈ F , sampled i.i.d. according to some ﬁxed but unknown
distribution over the instance space X, produces an output f ∈ F that is consistent with the training set. Then L is an (, δ)-learning










where σ1 and σ2 are the sizes of the representation of elements in Z and Y , respectively.
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for F , where   1/8 and δ < 1/4, must use sample size s d16 .
3. Learnability of scoring rules
Before diving in, we introduce some notation. Let N = {1,2, . . . ,n} be the set of voters, and let A = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} be
the set of alternatives; we also denote alternatives by {a,b, c, . . .}. Let L = L(A) be the set of linear preferences3 over A;
each voter has preferences i ∈ L. We denote the preference proﬁle, consisting of the voters’ preferences, by N = 〈1,2
, . . . ,n〉. A voting rule is a function f : LN → A, that maps preference proﬁles to winning alternatives.
Let α be a vector of m nonnegative real numbers such that αl  αl+1 for all l = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Let f α :LN → C be the
scoring rule deﬁned by the vector α, i.e., each voter awards αl points to the alternative it ranks in the lth place, and the
rule elects the alternative with the most points.
Since several alternatives may have maximal scores in an election, we must adopt some method of tie-breaking. Our
method works as follows. Ties are broken in favor of the alternative that was ranked ﬁrst by more voters; if several alterna-
tives have maximal scores and were ranked ﬁrst by the same number of voters, the tie is broken in favor of the alternative
that was ranked second by more voters; and so on.4
Let Snm be the class of scoring rules with n voters and m alternatives. Our goal is to learn, in the PAC model, some target
function f α∗ ∈ Snm . To this end, the learner receives a training set {(Nk , f α∗ (Nk )}k , where each Nk is drawn from a ﬁxed
distribution over LN ; let x jk = f α∗ (Nk ). For the proﬁle Nk , we denote by πkj,l the number of voters that ranked alternative





3.1. Eﬃcient learnability of Snm
Our main goal in this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For all n,m ∈N, the class Snm is eﬃciently PAC-learnable.
By Theorem 2.5, in order to prove Theorem 3.1 it is suﬃcient to validate the following two claims: 1) that there exists
an algorithm which, for any training set, runs in time polynomial in n, m, and the size of the training set, and outputs a
scoring rule which is consistent with the training set (assuming one exists); and 2) that the generalized dimension of the
class Snm is polynomial in n and m.
Remark 3.2. It is possible to prove Theorem 3.1 by using a transformation between scoring rules and sets of linear threshold
functions. Indeed, it is well known that the VC dimension (the restriction of the generalized dimension to boolean-valued
functions) of linear threshold functions over Rd is d + 1. In principle, it is possible to transform a scoring rule into a linear
threshold function that receives (generally speaking) vectors of rankings of alternatives as input. Given a training set of
proﬁles, we could transform it into a training set of rankings and use a learning algorithm.
However, we are interested in producing an accurate scoring rule according to a distribution D on preference proﬁles,
which represents typical proﬁles. It is possible to consider a many-to-one mapping between distributions over proﬁles and
distributions over the above-mentioned vectors of rankings. Unfortunately, when this procedure is used, it is nontrivial to
guarantee that the learned voting rule succeeds according to the original distribution D . Moreover, this procedure seems
to require an increase in sample complexity compared to the analysis given below. Therefore, we proceed with the more
“direct” agenda outlined above and detailed below.
It is rather straightforward to construct an eﬃcient algorithm that outputs consistent scoring rules. Given a training set,
we must choose the parameters of our scoring rule in a way that, for any example, the score of the designated winner is at
least as large as the scores of other alternatives. Moreover, if ties between the winner and a loser would be broken in favor
of the loser, then the winner’s score must be strictly higher than the loser’s. Our algorithm, given as Algorithm 1, simply
formulates all the constraints as linear inequalities, and solves the resulting linear program. The ﬁrst part of the algorithm
is meant to handle tie-breaking. Recall that x jk = f α∗ (Nk ).
A linear program can be solved in time that is polynomial in the number of variables and inequalities [24]; it follows
that Algorithm 1’s running time is polynomial in n, m, and the size of the training set.
Remark 3.3. Notice that any vector α with a “standard” representation, that is with rational coordinates such that both
numerator and denominator are integers represented by a polynomial number of bits, can be scaled to an equivalent vector
3 A binary relation which is antisymmetric, transitive, and total.
4 In case several alternatives have maximal scores and identical rankings everywhere, break ties arbitrarily—say, in favor of the alternative with the
smallest index.
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Xk ← ∅
for all x j 	= x jk do  x jk is the winner in example k
π ← πkjk − πkj
l0 ←min{l: πl 	= 0}
if πl0 < 0 then  Ties are broken in favor of x j




return a feasible solution α to the following linear program:










∀l = 1, . . . ,m− 1 αl  αl+1
∀l, αl  0
Algorithm 1. Given a training set of size s, the algorithm returns a scoring rule which is consistent with
the given examples, if one exists.
of integers which is also polynomially representable. In this case, the scores are always integral. Thus, instead of using a
strict inequality in the LP’s ﬁrst set of constraints, we can use a weak inequality with an additive term of 1.
Remark 3.4. Although the transformation between learning scoring rules and learning linear threshold functions mentioned
in Remark 3.2 has some drawbacks as a learning method, we conjecture that results on the computational complexity of
learning linear threshold functions can be leveraged to obtain computational eﬃciency. Indeed, well-known algorithms such
as Winnow [19] might suit this purpose.
Remark 3.5. Algorithm 1 can also be used to check, with high probability, if the voting rule the designer has in mind is
indeed a scoring rule, as described (in a different context) by Kalai [16] (we omit the details here). This further justiﬁes the
setting in which the voting rule the designer has in mind is known to be a scoring rule.
So, it remains to demonstrate that the generalized dimension of Snm is polynomial in n and m. The following lemma
shows this.
Lemma 3.6. The generalized dimension of the class Snm is at most m:
DG
(Snm)m.
Proof. According to Deﬁnition 2.3, we need to show that any set of cardinality m + 1 cannot be shattered by Snm . Let
S = {Nk }m+1k=1 be such a set, and let h, g be the two social choice functions that disagree on all preference proﬁles in S . We
shall construct a subset S1 ⊆ S such that there is no scoring rule f α that agrees with h on S1 and agrees with g on S \ S1.
Let us look at the ﬁrst preference proﬁle from our set, N1 . We shall assume without loss of generality that h(N1 ) = x1,
while g(N1 ) = x2, and that in N1 ties between x1 and x2 are broken in favor of x1. Let α be some parameter vector. If we
are to have h(N1 ) = f α(N1 ), it must hold that
m∑
l=1
π11,l · αl 
m∑
l=1
π12,l · αl, (4)
whereas if we wanted f α to agree with g we would want the opposite:
m∑
l=1
π11,l · αl <
m∑
l=1
π12,l · αl. (5)
More generally, we deﬁne, with respect to the proﬁle Nk , the vector πk as the vector whose lth coordinate is the
difference between the number of times the winner under h and the winner under g were ranked in the lth place:5
πk = πkh(k) − πkg(k). (6)
Now we can concisely write necessary conditions for f α agreeing on Nk with h or g , respectively, by writing:6
5 There is some abuse of notation here; if h(Nk ) = xl then by πkh(k) we mean πkl .
6 In all proﬁles except N1 , we are indifferent to the direction in which ties are broken.
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πk · α  0. (8)
Notice that each vector πk has exactly m coordinates. Since we have m + 1 such vectors (corresponding to the m + 1
proﬁles in S), there must be a subset of vectors that is linearly dependent. We can therefore express one of the vectors as
a linear combination of the others. Without loss of generality, we assume that the ﬁrst proﬁle’s vector can be written as a




βk · πk. (9)
Now, we shall construct our subset S1 of preference proﬁles as follows:
S1 =
{
k ∈ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}: βk  0
}
. (10)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f α agrees with h on Nk for k ∈ S1, and with g on the rest. We shall examine the
value of π1 · α:
π1 · α =
m+1∑
k=2
βk · πk · α =
∑
k∈S1
βk · πk · α +
∑
k/∈S1∪{1}
βk · πk · α  0. (11)
The last inequality is due to the construction of S1—whenever βk is negative, the sign of πk · α is nonpositive ( f α agrees
with g), and whenever βk is positive, the sign of πk · α is nonnegative (agreement with h).
Therefore, by Eq. (5), we have that f (N1 ) 	= x2 = g(N1 ). However, it holds that 1 /∈ S1, and we assumed that f α agrees
with g outside S1—this is a contradiction. 
Theorem 3.1 is thus proven. The upper bound on the generalized dimension of Snm is quite tight: in the next subsection
we show a lower bound of m− 3.
3.2. Lower bound for the generalized dimension of Snm
Theorem 2.6 implies that a lower bound on the generalized dimension of a function class is directly connected to the
complexity of learning it. In particular, a tight bound on the dimension gives us an almost exact idea of the number of
examples required to learn a scoring rule. Therefore, we wish to bound DG(Snm) from below as well.
Theorem 3.7. For all n 4, m 4, DG(Snm)m− 3.
Proof. We shall produce an example set of size m − 3 which is shattered by Snm . Deﬁne a preference proﬁle Nl , for
l = 3, . . . ,m− 1, as follows. For all l, the voters 1, . . . ,n− 1 rank alternative x j in place j, i.e., they vote x1 il x2 il · · · il xm .
The preferences nl (the preferences of voter n in proﬁle Nl ) are deﬁned as follows: alternative x2 is ranked in place l,
alternative x1 is ranked in place l + 1; the other alternatives are ranked arbitrarily by voter n. For example, if m = 5, n = 6,
the preference proﬁle N3 is:
13 23 33 43 53 63
x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x3
x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x4
x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x2
x4 x4 x4 x4 x4 x1
x5 x5 x5 x5 x5 x5
Lemma 3.8. For any scoring rule f α with α1 = α2  2α3 it holds that:
f α
(Nl )=
{ x1 αl = αl+1,
x2 αl > αl+1.
Proof. We shall ﬁrst verify that x2 has maximal score. x2’s score is at least (n − 1)α2 = (n − 1)α1. Let j  3; x j ’s score
is at most (n − 1)α3 + α1. Thus, the difference is at least (n − 1)(α1 − α3) − α1. Since α1 = α2  2α3, this is at least
(n− 1)(α1/2) − α1 > 0, where the last inequality holds for n 4.
1140 A.D. Procaccia et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1133–1149Now, under preference proﬁle Nl , x1’s score is (n − 1)α1 + αl+1 and x2’s score is (n − 1)α1 + αl . If αl = αl+1, the two
alternatives have identical scores, but x1 was ranked ﬁrst by more voters (in fact, by n − 1 voters), and thus the winner
is x1. If αl > αl+1, then x2’s score is strictly higher—hence in this case x2 is the winner. 
Armed with Lemma 3.8, we will now prove that the set {Nl }m−1l=3 is shattered by Snm . Let α1 be such that α11 = α12 
2α13 = 2α14 = · · · = 2α1m , and α2 be such that α11 = α12  2α13 > 2α14 > · · · > 2α1m . By the lemma, for all l = 3, . . . ,m − 1,
f α1 (Nl ) = x1, and f α2 (Nl ) = x2.
Let T ⊆ {3,4, . . . ,m − 1}. We must show that there exists α such that f α(Nl ) = x1 for all l ∈ T , and f α(Nl ) = x2 for
all l /∈ T . Indeed, conﬁgure the parameters such that α1 = α2 > 2α3, and αl = αl+1 iff l ∈ T . The result follows directly from
Lemma 3.8. 
4. Learnability of voting trees
Recall that we are dealing with a set of alternatives A = {x1, . . . , xm}; as before, we will also denote alternatives by
a,b, c ∈ A. A tournament is a complete binary irreﬂexive relation T over A; we denote the set of all possible tournaments
by T = T (A).
A binary voting tree is a binary tree with leaves labeled by alternatives. To determine the winner of the election with
respect to a tournament T , one must iteratively select two siblings, label their parent by the winner according to T , and
remove the siblings from the tree. This process is repeated until the root is labeled, and its label is the winner of the
election.
A preference proﬁle N of a set of voters N induces a tournament T ∈ T (A) as follows: aTb (i.e., a dominates b) if and
only if a majority of voters prefer a to b. Thus, a voting tree is in particular a voting rule, as deﬁned in Section 3. However,
for the purposes of this section it is suﬃcient to regard voting trees as functions f :T (A) → A, that is, we will disregard
the set of voters and simply consider the dominance relation T on A. We shall hereinafter refer to functions f :T (A) → A
as pairwise voting rules.
Let us therefore denote the class of voting trees over m alternatives by Vm; we emphasize the class depends only on m.
We would like to know what the sample complexity of learning functions in Vm is. To elaborate a bit, since we think of
voting trees as functions from T to A, the sample space is T .
4.1. Large voting trees
In this section, we will show that in general, the answer to the above question is that the complexity is exponential
in m. We will prove this by relying on Theorem 2.6; the theorem implies that in order to prove such a claim, it is suﬃcient
to demonstrate that the generalized dimension of Vm is at least exponential in m. This is the task we presently turn to.
Theorem 4.1. DG(Vm) is exponential in m.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we let m = 2k+ 2. We will associate every distinct binary vector v = 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 ∈ {0,1}k
with a distinct example in our set of tournaments S ⊆ T . To prove the theorem, we will show that Vm shatters this set S
of size 2k .
Let the set of alternatives be:
A = {a,b, x01, x11, x02, x12, . . . , x0k , x1k}.
For every vector v ∈ {0,1}k , deﬁne a tournament Tv as follows: for i = 1, . . . ,k, if vi = 0, we let x0i T vbTv x1i ; otherwise, if
vi = 1, then x1i T vbTv x0i . In addition, for all tournaments Tv , and all i = 1, . . . ,k, j = 0,1, a beats x ji , but a loses to b. We
denote by S the set of these 2k tournaments.7 Let f be the constant function b, i.e., a voting tree which consists of only
the node b; let g be the constant function a. We must prove that for every S1 ⊆ S , there is a voting tree such that b wins
for every tournament in S1 (in other words, the tree agrees with f ), and a wins for every tournament in S \ S1 (the tree
agrees with g). Consider the tree in Fig. 2, which we refer to as the ith 2-gadget.
Fig. 2. 2-gadget.
7 The relations described above are not complete, but the way they are completed is of no consequence.
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Fig. 4. v-gadget∗ .
With respect to this tree, b wins a tournament Tv ∈ S iff vi = j. Indeed, if vi = j, then x ji T vbTvx1− ji , and in particular b
beats x1− ji ; if vi 	= j, then x1− ji T vbTv x ji , so b loses to x1− ji .
Let v ∈ {0,1}k . We will now use the 2-gadget to build a tree where b wins only the tournament Tv ∈ S , and loses every
other tournament in S . Consider a balanced tree such that the deepest nodes in the tree are in fact 2-gadgets (as in Fig. 3).
As before, b wins in the ith 2-gadget iff vi = j. We will refer to this tree as a v-gadget.
Now, notice that if b wins in each of the 2-gadgets (and this is the case in the tournament Tv ), then b is the winner
of the entire election. On the other hand, let v ′ 	= v , i.e., there exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that w.l.o.g. 0 = v ′i 	= vi = 1. Then
it holds that x0i T v ′bTv ′x
1
i ; this implies that x
0
i wins in the ith 2-gadget. x
0
i proceeds to win the entire election, unless it is
beaten in some stage by some other alternative x jl —but this must be also an alternative that beats b, as it survived the lth
2-gadget. In any case, b cannot win the election.
Consider the small extension, in Fig. 4, of the v-gadget, which (for lack of a better name) we call the v-gadget∗ .
Recall that, in every tournament in S , a beats any alternative xij but loses to b. Therefore, by our discussion regarding
the v-gadget, b wins the election described by the v-gadget∗ only in the tournament T v ; for any other tournament in S ,
alternative a wins the election.
We now present a tree and prove that it is as required, i.e., in any tournament in S1, b is the winner, and in any
tournament in S \ S1, a prevails. Let us enumerate the tournaments in S1:
S1 = {Tv1 , . . . , Tvr }.
We construct a balanced tree, as in Fig. 5, where the bottom levels consist of the vl-gadgets*, for l = 1, . . . , r.
Let Tvl ∈ S1. What is the result of this tournament in the election described by this tree? First, note that b prevails in the
vl-gadget∗ . The only alternatives that can reach any level above the gadgets are a and b, and b always beats a. Therefore,
b proceeds to win the election. Conversely, let Tv ∈ S \ S1. Then a survives in every vl-gadget∗ , for l = 1, . . . , r. a surely
proceeds to win the entire election.
We have shown that Vm shatters S , thus completing the proof. 
Remark 4.2. Even if we restrict our attention to the class of balanced voting trees (corresponding to a playoff schedule),
the dimension of the class is still exponential in m. Indeed, any unbalanced tree can be transformed to an identical (as a
voting rule) balanced tree. If the tree’s height is h, this can be done by replacing every leaf at depth d < h, labeled by an
alternative a, by a balanced subtree of height d − h in which all the leaves are labeled by a. This implies that the class of
balanced trees can shatter any sample which is shattered by Vm .
Remark 4.3. The proof we have just completed, along with Lemma 2.4, imply that the number of different pairwise voting
rules that can be represented by trees is double exponential in m, which highlights the high expressiveness of voting trees.
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Theorem 4.1, coupled with Theorem 2.6, implies that the sample complexity of learning arbitrary voting trees is expo-
nential in n and m.
4.2. Small voting trees
In the previous section, we have seen that in general, a large number of examples is needed in order to learn voting trees
in the PAC model. This result relied on the number of leaves in the trees being exponential in the number of alternatives.
However, in many realistic settings one can expect the voting tree to be compactly represented, and in particular one can
usually expect the number of leaves to be at most polynomial in m. Let us denote by V (k)m the class of voting trees over m
alternatives, with at most k leaves. Our goal in this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. DG(V(k)m ) = O(k logm).
This theorem implies, in particular, that if the number of leaves k is polynomial in m, then the dimension of V (k)m is
polynomial in m. In turn, this implies by Lemma 2.5 that the sample complexity of V (k)m is only polynomial in m. In other
words, there is a polynomial p(m,1/,1/δ) such that, given a training set of size p(m,1/,1/δ), any algorithm that returns
some tree consistent with the training set is an (, δ)-learning algorithm for V (k)m .
To prove the theorem, we require the following straightforward lemma.
Lemma 4.5. |V(k)m | k ·mk · Ck−1 , where Ck is the kth Catalan number, given by






Proof. The number of voting trees with exactly k leaves is at most the number of binary tree structures multiplied by the
number of possible assignments of alternatives to leaves. The number of assignments is clearly bounded by mk . Moreover,
it is well known that the number of rooted ordered binary trees with k leaves is the (k − 1) Catalan number. So, the total
number of voting trees with exactly k leaves is bounded by mk · Ck−1, and the number of voting trees with at most k leaves
is at most k ·mk · Ck−1. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By Lemma 4.5, we have that∣∣V(k)m ∣∣ k ·mk · Ck−1.
Therefore, by Lemma 2.4:
DG
(V(k)m ) log∣∣V(k)m ∣∣= O(k logm). 
4.3. Computational complexity
In the previous section, we restricted our attention to voting trees where the number of leaves is polynomial in k. We
have demonstrated that the dimension of this class is polynomial in m, which implies that the sample complexity of the
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learning algorithm (Theorem 2.5).
It seems that the signiﬁcant bottleneck, especially in the setting of automated voting rule design (ﬁnding a compact
representation for a voting rule that the designer has in mind), is the number of queries posed to the designer, so in this
regard we are satisﬁed that realistic voting trees are learnable. Nonetheless, in some contexts we may also be interested
in computational complexity: given a training set of polynomial size, how computationally hard is it to ﬁnd a voting tree
which is consistent with the training set?
In this section we explore the above question. We will assume hereinafter that the structure of the voting tree is known
a priori. This is an assumption that we did not make before, but observe that, at least for balanced trees, Theorems 4.1
and 4.4 hold regardless. We shall try to determine how hard it is to ﬁnd an assignment to the leaves which is consistent
with the training set. We will refer to the computational problem as Tree-SAT (pun intended).
Deﬁnition 4.6. In the Tree-SAT problem, we are given a binary tree, where some of the leaves are already labeled by
alternatives, and a training set that consists of pairs (T j ,xi j ), where T j ∈ T and xi j ∈ A. We are asked whether there exists
an assignment of alternatives to the rest of the leaves which is consistent with the training set, i.e., for all j, the winner in
T j with respect to the tree is xi j .
Notice that in our formulation of the problem, some of the leaves are already labeled. However, it is reasonable to expect
any eﬃcient algorithm that ﬁnds a consistent tree, given that one exists, to be able to solve the Tree-SAT problem. Hence,
an NP-hardness result implies that such an algorithm is not likely to exist.
Theorem 4.7. Tree-Sat is NP-complete.
Proof. It is obvious that Tree-SAT is in NP . In order to show NP-hardness, we present a reduction from 3SAT. In this
problem, one is given a conjunction of clauses, where each clause is a disjunction of three literals. One is asked whether
the given formula has a satisfying assignment. It is known that 3SAT is NP-complete [11].
Given an instance of 3SAT with variables {x1, . . . , xm}, and clauses {l j1 ∨ l j2 ∨ l j3}kj=1, we construct an instance of Tree-Sat
as follows: the set of alternatives is
A = {a,b, x1,¬x1, c1, x2,¬x2, c2, . . . , xm,¬xm, cm}.
For each clause j, we deﬁne a tournament T j as some tournament that satisﬁes the following restrictions:




3 beat any other alternative among the alternatives xi,¬xi , possibly excluding their own negations.




3, but beats any other alternative among the alternatives xi,¬xi .
In addition, all tournaments in our instance of Tree-SAT satisfy the following conditions:
1. b beats any alternative which corresponds to a literal, but loses to a.
2. For all i = 1, . . . ,m, ¬xi beats xi .
3. ci loses to xi and ¬xi , and beats any other literal and the alternatives a and b. The tournaments are arbitrarily deﬁned
with respect to competitions between ci and ck , i 	= k.
Finally, for each tournament, we require the winner to be alternative b. We now proceed to construct the given (partially
assigned) tree. We start, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, by deﬁning a gadget which we call an i-gadget, illustrated in Fig. 6.
In this subtree, two leaves are already assigned with xi and ci . Now, with respect to any of the tournaments we deﬁned,
if we assign ¬xi to the last leaf, then ¬xi proceeds to beat ci , and subsequently beats xi . If we assign xi to the third leaf,
then xi beats ci and wins the election. If we assign any other alternative that is not ck for some k = 1, . . . ,m, then that
alternative is defeated by ci , which in turn is beaten by xi . Finally, if ck is assigned, it either loses to ci and then xi is the
winner, or it beats ci and proceeds to beat xi . To conclude the point, either xi , ¬xi , or ck for some k 	= i survive the i-gadget.
Using the i-gadgets, we design a tree that will complete the construction of our Tree-SAT instance; the tree is described
in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. i-gadget.
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We now prove that this is indeed a reduction. We ﬁrst have to show that if the given 3SAT instance is satisﬁable, there
is an assignment to the leaves of our tree (in particular, choices of xi or ¬xi) such that, for each of the m tournaments,
the winner is b. Consider some satisfying assignment to the 3SAT instance. For every literal li that is assigned a truth
value, we assign the label li to the unlabeled leaf of the i-gadget, i.e., we make li survive the i-gadget. Now, consider some






3 must be true; as these three literals beat all other literals in the
tournament T j , one of these three literals reaches the competition versus a, and wins; subsequently, this literal loses to
alternative b. Therefore, b is the winner of the election. Since this is true for any j = 1, . . . ,m, we have that the assignment
is consistent with the given tournaments.
In the other direction, consider an instance of 3SAT which is not satisﬁable, and ﬁx some assignment to the leaves of the
tree. A ﬁrst case that we consider is that under this assignment, ck survives some i-gadget, i 	= k. ck cannot be beaten on the
way to the root of the tree, except by another c alternative. Hence, b does not win in any of the constructed tournaments.
A second case to consider is that for each i-gadget, either xi or ¬xi survives. The corresponding assignment to the 3SAT




3 are all false. This implies that in T j some other
literal other than these three reaches the top of the tree to compete against a, and loses. Subsequently, a competes against
b and wins, making a the winner of the election with respect to tournament T j . Hence, this is not an assignment which is
consistent with all tournaments—but this is true with respect to any such assignment. 
Despite Theorem 4.7, it seems that in practice, solving the Tree-Sat problem is sometimes possible; we shall empirically
demonstrate this.
Our simulations were carried out as follows. Given a ﬁxed tree structure, we randomly assigned alternatives (out of a pool
of 32 alternatives) to the leaves of the tree. We then used this tree to determine the winners in 20 random tournaments over
our 32 alternatives. Next, we measured the time it took to ﬁnd some assignment to the leaves of the tree (not necessarily
the original one) which is consistent with the training set of 20 tournaments. We repeated this procedure 10 times for each
number of leaves in {4,8,16,32,64}, and took the average of all ten runs.
The problem of ﬁnding a consistent tree can easily be represented as a constraint satisfaction problem, or in particular
as a SAT problem. Indeed, for every node, one simply has to add one constraint per tournament which involves the node
and its two children. To ﬁnd a satisfying assignment, we used the SAT solver zChaff. The simulations were carried out on a
PC with a Pentium D (dual core) CPU, running Linux, with 2 GB of RAM and a 2.8 GHz clock speed.
We experimented with two different tree structures. The ﬁrst is seemingly the simplest—a binary tree which is as close
to a chain as possible, i.e., every node is either a leaf, or the parent of a leaf; we refer to these trees as caterpillars. The
second is intuitively the most complicated: a balanced tree. Notice that, given that the number of leaves is k, the number
of nodes in both cases is 2k − 1. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 8.
In the case of balanced trees, it is indeed hard to ﬁnd a consistent tree. Adding more sample tournaments would add
even more constraints and make the task harder. However, in most elections the number of alternatives is usually not above
several dozen, and the problem may still be solvable. Furthermore, the problem is far easier with respect to caterpillars
(even though the reduction in Theorem 4.7 builds trees that are “almost caterpillars”). Therefore, we surmise that for many
tree structures, it may be practically possible (in terms of the computational effort) to ﬁnd a consistent assignment, even
when the input is relatively large, while for others the problem is quite computationally hard even in practice.
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5. On learning voting rules “close” to target rules
Heretofore, we have concentrated on learning voting rules that are known to be either scoring rules or voting trees. In
particular, we have assumed that there is a scoring rule or a voting tree that is consistent with the given training set.
In this section, we push the envelope by asking the following question: given examples that are consistent with some
general voting rule, is it possible to learn a scoring rule or a small voting tree that is “close” to the target rule?
Mathematically we are actually asking whether there exist target voting rules f ∗ such that min f α∈Snm err( f α), or
min f ∈V∗m err( f ), is large. This of course depends on the underlying distribution D . In the rest of this section, the implicit
assumption is that D is the simplest nontrivial distribution over proﬁles, namely the uniform distribution. Nevertheless, the
uniform distribution usually does not reﬂect real preferences of voters; this is an assumption we are making for the sake of
analysis. In light of this discussion, the deﬁnition of distance between voting rules is going to be the fraction of preference
proﬁles on which the two rules disagree.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A voting rule f :LN → A is a c-approximation of a voting rule g iff f and g agree on a c-fraction of the
possible preference proﬁles:∣∣{N∈ LN : f (N)= g(N)}∣∣ c · (m!)n.
In other words, the question is: given a training set {(Nk , f (Nj )}k , where f :LN → A is some voting rule, how hard is
it to learn a scoring rule or a voting tree that c-approximates f , for c that is close to 1?
It turns out that the answer is: it is impossible. We shall ﬁrst give an extreme example for the case of scoring rules.
Indeed, there are voting rules that disagree with any scoring rule on almost all of the preference proﬁles; if the target rule
f is such a rule, it is impossible to ﬁnd, and of course impossible to learn, a scoring rule that is “close” to f .
In order to see this, consider the following voting rule that we call ﬂipped veto: each voter awards one point to the
alternative it ranks last; the winner is the alternative with the most points. In addition, ties are broken according to the
lexicographic order on alternative names. This rule is of course not reasonable as a preference aggregation method, but
still—it is a valid voting rule.
Proposition 5.2. Let f α be a scoring rule that is a c-approximation of ﬂipped veto. Then c  1/m.
Proof. Let N be a preference proﬁle such that f α(N ) = ﬂipped veto(N) = x∗ , for some x∗ ∈ A. Deﬁne a set BN ⊆ LN
as follows: each proﬁle in the set is obtained by switching the place of an alternative x ∈ A, x 	= x∗ , with the place of x∗ ,
in the ordering of each voter that did not rank x∗ last.8 For a preference proﬁle N1 ∈ BN that was obtained by switching
x with x∗ , it holds that the winner under ﬂipped veto is x∗ , since its score did not decrease as a result of the switches,
while its situation in terms of tie-breaking remained the same (that is, its name did not change). In addition, under f α the
situation of x in N1 , with respect to score and tie-breaking, is at least as good as the situation of x∗ in N (voters that have
not switched the two alternatives are ones that rank x∗ last, and the score of the other alternatives remains unchanged).
8 It cannot be the case that all voters ranked x∗ last, by our tie-breaking assumption with respect to f α .
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that x∗ is ranked last by at least one voter in N , and hence in f α(N1 ) ties between x and x∗ are broken in favor of x. It
follows that f α(N1 ) = x. Therefore, for any preference proﬁle in BN , f α and ﬂipped veto do not agree.
We claim that for any two preference proﬁles N1 and N2 on which f α and ﬂipped veto agree, it holds that BN1 ∩
BN2 = ∅. Indeed, assume that there exists 
N∈ BN1 ∩ BN2 . Assume ﬁrst that the winner in both proﬁles is x
∗ . It cannot be
the case that the same alternative was switched with x∗ in order to obtain N from both N1 and N2 —that would imply
N1 and N2 are identical. Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that x1 was switched with x∗ in N1 (only in the rankings of voters that
did not rank x∗ last), and x2 was switched with x∗ in N2 . But this means that both x1 and x2 are winners in N under f α
(by the fact that x∗ was a winner in both N1 and N2 )—a contradiction.
In addition, in any two preference proﬁles N1 and N2 such that
f α
(N1 )= ﬂipped veto(N1 )= x∗,
and
f α
(N2 )= ﬂipped veto(N2 )= x∗∗,
it holds that BN1 ∩ BN2 = ∅, as ﬂipped veto elects x
∗ in all proﬁles in BN1 , but elects x
∗∗ in all proﬁles in BN2 .
It follows that for every preference proﬁle on which f α and ﬂipped veto agree, there are at least m − 1 distinct proﬁles
on which the two voting rules disagree; this proves the proposition. 
We shall now formulate our main result for this section. The theorem states that almost every voting rule cannot be
approximated by a factor better than 12 by any small family of voting rules. We shall subsequently see that the theorem
holds for small voting trees as well as scoring rules.
Theorem 5.3. Let Rnm be a family of voting rules of size exponential in n andm, and let , δ > 0. For large enough values of n andm, at
least a (1− δ)-fraction of the voting rules f :Ln → {x1, . . . , xm} satisfy the following property: no voting rule in Rnm is a (1/2+ )-
approximation of f .
Proof. We will surround each voting rule f ∈ Rnm with a “ball” B( f ), which contains all the voting rules for which f is a
(1/2 + )-approximation. We will then show that the union of all these balls covers at most a δ-fraction of the set of the
space of voting rules. This implies that for at least a (1 − δ)-fraction of the voting rules, no scoring rule is a (1/2 + )-
approximation.
For a given f , what is the size of B( f )? As there are (m!)n possible preference proﬁles, the ball contains rules that do
not agree with f on at most (1/2− )(m!)n preference proﬁles. For a proﬁle on which there is disagreement, there are m







How large is this expression? Let B ′( f ) be the set of all voting rules that disagree with f on exactly (1/2 + )(m!)n
preference proﬁles. It holds that


















where the last inequality holds for a large enough m. But since the total number of voting rules, m(m!)n , is greater than the






















9 This reasoning also takes into account voting rules that agree with f on more than (1/2+ )(m!)n proﬁles.
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equivalently, it must hold that |Rnm| δ ·m(m!)n . However, by the assumption |Rnm| is only exponential in n and m (rather
than double exponential), so for large enough values of n and m, the above condition does not hold. 
Notice that the number of distinct voting trees with at most k leaves, as voting rules f :LN → A where |A| = m, is
bounded from above for any number of voters n by the expression given in Lemma 4.5, namely k ·mk · Ck−1. Therefore, we
have as a corollary from Theorem 5.3:
Corollary 5.4. For large enough values of n and m, almost all voting rules cannot be approximated by V (k)m , k polynomial in m, to a
factor better than 12 .
In order to obtain a similar corollary regarding scoring rules, we require the following lemma, which may be of indepen-
dent interest.
Lemma 5.5. There exists a polynomial p(n,m) such that for all n,m ∈N, |Snm| 2p(n,m) .
Proof. It is true that there are an inﬁnite number of ways to choose the vector α that deﬁnes a scoring rule. Nevertheless,
what we are really interested in is the number of distinct scoring rules. For instance, if α1 = 2α2, then f α1 ≡ f α2 , i.e., the
two vectors deﬁne the same voting rule.
It is clear that two scoring rules f α1 and f α2 are distinct only if the following condition holds: there exist two alternatives
x j1 , x j2 ∈ C , and a preference proﬁle N , such that f α1 (N ) = x j1 and f α2 (N ) = x j2 . This holds only if there exist two
alternatives x j1 and x j2 and a preference proﬁle N such that under α1, x j1 ’s score is strictly greater than x j2 ’s, and
under α2, either x j2 ’s score is greater or the two alternatives are tied, and the tie is broken in favor of x j2 .




















where the inequality is an equality only if ties are broken in favor of x j2 , i.e., if l0 =min{l: π j1,l 	= π j2,l}, then π j1,l < π j2,l .10
Let π = π j1 − π j2 . As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, Eqs. (16) and (17) can be concisely rewritten as
π · α1 > 0 π · α2, (18)
where the inequality is an equality only if the ﬁrst nonzero position in π is negative.
In order to continue, we opt to reinterpret the above discussion geometrically. Each point in Rm corresponds to a possible
choice of parameters α. Now, each possible choice of π is the normal to a hyperplane. These hyperplanes partition the
space into cells: the vectors in the interior of each cell agree on the signs of dot products with all vectors π . More formally,
if α1 and α2 are two points in the interior of a cell, then for any vector π , π · α1 > 0 ⇔ π · α2 > 0. By Eq. (18), this
implies that any two scoring rules f α1 and f α2 , where α1 and α2 are in the interior of the same cell, are identical.
What about points residing in the intersection of several cells? These vectors always agree with the vectors in one of
the cells, as ties are broken according to rankings induced by the preference proﬁle, i.e., according to the parameters that
deﬁne our hyperplanes. Therefore, the points in the intersection can be conceptually annexed to one of the cells.
So, we have reached the conclusion that the number of distinct scoring rules is at most the number of cells. Hence, it is
enough to bound the number of cells; we claim this number is exponential in n and m. Indeed, each π is an m-vector, in
which every coordinate is an integer in the set {−n,−n+1, . . . ,n−1,n}. It follows that there are at most (2n+1)m possible
hyperplanes. It is known [7] that given k hyperplanes in d-dimensional space, the number of cells is at most O (kd). In our
case, k (2n + 1)m and d =m, so we have obtained a bound of:
(
(2n+ 1)m)m  (3n)m2 = (2log3n)m2 = 2m2 log3n.  (19)
Remark 5.6. This lemma implies, according to Lemma 2.4, that there exists a polynomial p(n,m) such that for all n,m ∈ N,
DG(Snm) p(n,m). However, we have already obtained a tighter upper bound of m.
Finally, using Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.5 we obtain:
10 W.l.o.g. we disregard the case where π j1 = π j2 ; the reader can verify that taking this case into account multiplies the ﬁnal result by an exponential
factor at most.
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Remark 5.8. Proposition 5.2 can seemingly be circumvented by removing the requirement that in a scoring rule deﬁned by a
vector α, αl  αl+1 for all l. Indeed, ﬂipped veto is essentially a scoring rule with αm = 1 and αl = 0 for all l 	=m. However,
the constant voting rule which always elects the same alternative has the same inapproximability ratio, even when this
property of scoring rules is not taken into account. Moreover, Corollary 5.7 also holds when scoring rules are not assumed
to satisfy this property.
6. Discussion
We have demonstrated the possibility of learning scoring rules and small voting trees. We have argued that, given a black
box speciﬁcation of the choice criteria of the society, learning from examples allows one to eﬃciently (albeit approximately)
design such rules. The black box reﬂects some ideal voting rule the designer has in mind, which satisﬁes, for instance,
different desirable properties. The designer thus essentially translates a cumbersome representation of a voting rule (hidden
within the black box) to a concisely represented voting rule which is easy to understand and apply.
In Section 5 we have explored the possibility of extending our approach to the setting where the designer has in mind
some general voting rule, rather than a scoring rule or a voting tree, and we would like to ﬁnd a scoring rule or voting tree
that is as close as possible. Technically, our learning-theoretic results basically hold (up to polynomial factors in the sample
complexity) in this setting, although the situation is more diﬃcult in terms of computational complexity.
Unfortunately, it turns out (Corollaries 5.4 and 5.7) that many voting rules cannot be approximated, neither by using
scoring rules nor by small voting trees. However, this negative result relied implicitly on assuming a uniform distribution
over proﬁles. More importantly, it might be the case that some of the important families of voting rules can be approximated
by scoring rules or small voting trees. Therefore, we do not rule out at this point the application of our approach to
designing general voting rules by directly learning scoring rules or small voting trees that approximate them.
Criticisms of our approach. A possible concern, given Corollaries 5.4 and 5.7, is with our general motivation. Indeed, if we
assume that the designer has in mind, say, a scoring rule, it can be argued that the designer must be aware of this fact, and
must have knowledge of the parameters of the rule. However, recall that the class of scoring rules is exactly the class of
anonymous, neutral, and consistent voting rules [26]. Hence, if the designer selects winners in any way that satisﬁes these
three desiderata, a scoring rule with unknown parameters would be obtained.
A similar case can be made for voting trees. The underlying assumption behind the literature on implementation by
voting trees (see, e.g., [10] and the references therein) is that voting trees are an abstract model of decision making, and
that many voting rules can in fact be represented as voting trees, even if this transformation is not obvious. For example,
the Copeland rule, that selects an alternative that beats the largest number of alternatives in pairwise elections, can be
represented as an elaborate voting tree if there are up to seven alternatives [23]. Hence, the designer might be using a
voting rule that can be represented as a voting tree, but might be unaware of the exact representation.
Let us discuss two additional possible criticisms regarding our general setting. First, notice that in multiagent environ-
ments, the number of alternatives m can be large; for example, if the agents are voting on joint plans [9], then the number
of alternatives might be signiﬁcantly larger than the number of agents. Hence, complexity results that depend on the num-
ber of alternatives are meaningful.
Second, it has been suggested that the designer might ﬁnd it easier to express the ethical properties that are considered
mandatory, rather than express the voting rule by examples. We argue that this is rarely the case. Indeed, it is very diﬃcult
to concisely represent properties in computational settings; a universal, agreed-upon language would have to be used, and
it is hard to imagine how one would go about creating such a language. On the other hand, specifying a voting rule by
(a polynomial number of) examples provides a concise description of the voting rule, and, as we have shown, can lead to a
close approximation.
Future work. We mention two directions for future research. First, imagine the following scenario: the designer has in mind
a huge voting tree, and would like to know whether there exists a smaller voting tree that implements the same voting
rule. The same goes for scoring rules, e.g., the designer might have in mind a scoring rule with huge values for components
of the vector α. This is a setting closely related to ours, but our results do not hold in the alternative setting.
Second, it might prove interesting to study the learnability of larger families of voting rules that have a concise repre-
sentation. One compelling example is the class of generalized scoring rules recently proposed by Xia and Conitzer [25].
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